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The Politics of Opposition:  
China’s Moderates at the Political Consultative Conference of 1946 
Ryan M. Winter 
 
By the end of 1946, US special representative to China General George 
Marshall proclaimed his mission a failure and returned home. The tension 
between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists had escalated so tremendously 
that Marshall no longer felt he could be of service in negotiating a peaceful 
compromise. In his concluding remarks on the mission, Marshall placed his final 
hope in the “third way,” the diverse group of Chinese moderates and nonpartisans 
who he felt could be the “salvation of the situation.”1 A government that included 
this “splendid group of men” was, in Marshall’s opinion, the last chance for peace 
and democracy in China. Those who have studied the Marshall mission may find 
this last-ditch effort baffling. After all, Marshall routinely criticized the third force 
for lacking a focused and practical plan for the country’s future, and regarded 
them as weak and unreliable.2  However, despite his misgivings, Marshall 
understood that the Chinese liberals represented the best hope for compromise 
between dictatorship and communism. Any democratic government would need 
the approval of the third force to be seen as legitimate, and therefore their 
approval was of paramount importance.3 Many historians have written off the 
third force as an insignificant bunch of elitists. Suzanne Pepper, for instance, 
dismissed them as “weak, disorganized, and powerless” at best; at worst, they 
were “opportunists and pawns of the two major parties.”4 The third force has 
often been perceived as possessing lofty democratic ideals but no practical 
solutions, a shortcoming which contributed to the eventual failure of diplomacy in 
China.5 Looking back, it is easy to find faults in the third force and proclaim their 
failure as inevitable. However, when analyzed in the context of the first Political 
Consultative Conference (PCC), a series of multiparty negotiations held in 
January of 1946, the theory of third party incompetence begins to break down. A 
more in-depth analysis of the Chinese third force reveals that their liberal 
philosophies were backed up with practical plans, and primary source documents 
from the PCC reveal that Chinese liberals in fact possessed a detailed and 
comprehensive strategy for China’s future. 
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 Although mention of the PCC in English-language history texts is rare, the 
third parties themselves have been discussed at great length in many accounts of 
the civil war era.6 Roads Not Taken, compiled by Roger Jeans, gives valuable 
insight into the history, philosophies, and goals of many of the liberal groups 
which were together called the Democratic League (DL). However, it also 
subscribes to the view that third parties were lackluster in their political plans, and 
that they sidestepped difficult issues. For example, in his introduction Jeans 
asked, “Did not the very minor nature of the little parties demonstrate clearly for 
all to see the futility of opposition in twentieth-century China?”7 Despite clear 
evidence from the Political Consultative Conference and throughout the civil war 
era that the third force was anything but “minor,” other historians have adopted 
this view. For example, Thomas D. Curran saw this so-called “futility” of the 
third parties as stemming from a lack of “clarity about precisely how they 
expected to accomplish their objectives. They seem to have consciously avoided 
hardball politics, hoping to generate a ground swell of public support for their 
cause but failing to formulate a concrete strategy for translating that support into 
political action.”8 Historian Wang Chen-main has ridiculed liberals as “unrealistic 
philosophers and old scholars,” and argued that “trying to build a democratic 
castle on loose Chinese sand was one of the reasons for the demise of Marshall’s 
mission.”9 Although they routinely discount the third force’s plans as unworkable, 
few scholars have actually scrutinized what exactly these plans were. The Second 
Political Consultative Conference presents a wonderful opportunity to assess the 
charges against the liberal and moderate forces by examining the goals and 
strategies, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the third force. Speeches 
and opinions published by delegates to the PCC can be integrated with secondary 
literature on the time period in order to evaluate the practicality of the third 
force’s plans and strategies at one critical moment in time. 
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At the end of 1945, as the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Government 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rushed towards a final confrontation, it 
appeared, for one brief moment, that peace would prevail. Most Chinese, 
including the Communists, were even willing to continue under the leadership of 
the corrupt and repressive KMT regime, as long as Chiang Kai-shek made a few 
small concessions to opposition parties and granted constitutional freedoms.10 The 
country had just emerged from fourteen years of brutal warfare—fifteen million 
Chinese had died, and the Japanese army’s scorched earth policies had displaced 
many more—and most Chinese were desperate to find peaceful alternatives to 
civil war.11 From Kunming to Chengdu, massive student demonstrations 
demanded coalition government and an end to the hostilities between the KMT 
and CCP, but politics complicated the common desire for peace.12 As long as 
Generalissimo Chiang enjoyed unconditional financial and military support from 
the United States, he had no incentive to soften his position and make concessions 
to the Communists. On the other hand, the CCP would never give in to Chiang’s 
demands to relinquish the areas it had liberated.13 Due to public opinion, both 
Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek felt compelled to advocate for peace, but their 
terms were irreconcilable, and diplomatic talks in Chongqing had broken down. 
The US government, too, had a vested interest in keeping China stable, 
and for this reason it encouraged Chiang to include liberals and opposition parties 
in his government. John Fairbank, US Director of Information Services in China 
and a man intimately familiar with the country’s political culture, endorsed this 
foreign policy.14 Fairbank observed a marked shift in the alignment of the middle 
forces in the months leading up to the PCC. These liberals, who had previously 
remained neutral but were constantly repressed and threatened by Chiang’s secret 
police, were becoming disillusioned with the KMT. If they were not quickly 
brought into coalition government, they might join the enemy and Chiang could 
lose all vestiges of credibility.15 At the same time that Chiang was driving liberals 
away, Mao was actively courting them.16 His program of New Democracy called 
for many of the same reforms as the middle forces; the goal was to first transform 
China into a democratic state, and then let the people decide which party should 
lead. Mao was confident that given the chance, the vast majority of Chinese 
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citizens would prefer his leadership to the corrupt and ineffective KMT’s.17 In this 
way, the CCP hoped to draw in a large coalition of allies and then crush the 
isolated KMT. 
Due to steady pressure from the Communists, the US, and the Democratic 
League, Chiang finally relented to holding a political conference in January of 
1946, and invited the CCP, third parties, and independent political figures from 
across the country.18 In order to achieve peace, the PCC was charged with 
completely reorganizing the political and military framework to make space for a 
new constitution and a democratic government. For the third parties, the most 
pressing concern was military demobilization. As they saw it, if hostilities 
between the CCP and KMT did not cease, the civil war would render all other 
considerations meaningless.19 Equally important, but less immediate, was the 
need to open up China’s one-party system to allow for a true democracy.  
Recognizing that the outcome of the talks could literally mean life or death 
for millions of their countrymen, all delegates treated the conference with respect 
and civility. The Shanghai newspapers Sin Wen Pao and Ta Kung Pao both 
described a pre-convention get-together of some of the delegates, held on January 
7. Over tea, they talked for hours and reportedly behaved with utmost sincerity 
and frankness, a feat “unprecedented to the political history of China.”20 The 
delegates knew that the fate of their country, and perhaps the world, depended on 
the outcome of the PCC. Speaking for the Democratic League at the conference’s 
opening ceremony, Chairman Zhang Lan reflected, “As we attend this Political 
Consultative Conference, we remember our responsibility to the people and the 
debt owed to those who died during the eight-year War of Resistance. Our 
victory, and this country’s independence, was won by the blood of these martyrs, 
and we cannot let this success be in vain.”21  
At the conference, the KMT was awarded eight seats, the CCP seven, and 
the rest went, at least theoretically, to the middle forces.22 Nine were given to the 
Democratic League and nine to nonpartisans and other independents. These 
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numbers alone should indicate the power and legitimacy possessed by the middle 
forces at the time of the PCC. Historians like Pepper and Curran, who argued that 
the middle forces were insignificant or politically irrelevant, would struggle to 
explain why the middle forces outnumbered the right and the left combined.  
After weeks of difficult negotiations, the PCC ended successfully. 
Although not every party was completely satisfied, its resolutions were 
unanimously approved by the delegates, and China’s oppressive one-party system 
had finally cracked. Even more promising, the draft of the new constitution 
guaranteed all the basic rights and freedoms the liberals had requested.23 
Celebrations broke out across the streets of Chongqing, and over all of China, as 
hope for peace renewed. This atmosphere of jubilation, however, was short-lived, 
and tainted by KMT crackdowns. Clearly, the ruling party had no intentions of 
keeping its word or even protecting basic civil liberties. Chiang promised at the 
conference’s opening that political rights and freedoms would now be extended to 
all, but he did not follow through. Journalists reported that during the conference 
itself, KMT secret police ransacked the lodgings of Democratic League (DL) 
delegates, jeopardizing the trust and good-will of the meetings.24 When DL 
members tried to hold peaceful public meetings to inform citizens of the PCC 
proceedings, hired thugs threw rocks at speakers and violently broke up the 
assemblies.25 Already marred by these instances of KMT insincerity, the PCC 
resolutions completely dissolved over the following months, when reactionaries in 
the KMT leadership flatly denied the legitimacy of the PCC’s reforms.26 Chiang’s 
secret police continued to harass and even assassinate opposition party leaders, 
and within months he convened a puppet National Assembly in violation of the 
PCC agreements.27 Aggressively remobilizing—again in contrast to his promises 
at the PCC—Chiang transported troops to the front lines with American 
assistance. 28 The CCP responded in kind, and once war broke out, the middle 
forces lacked the power to impose peace. Because of this spectacular failure, the 
PCC has often been held up as an instance of the futility of the middle forces. 
Examining the different groups that made up the DL and the strategies they 
pursued at this conference can help uncover the reality of their influence and 
political focus at the time.  
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Zhang Lan, an esteemed scholar and outspoken critic of the KMT, acted as 
chairman of the DL, and was accompanied by prominent civil rights activist Luo 
Longji. Since the Democratic League represented an amalgam of China’s middle 
forces, only two leaders specifically represented this party and the other seven 
seats were filled by the various groups and associations enumerated below.  
The Nationalist-Socialist Party (NSP), led by Zhang Dongsun and Zhang 
Junmai, was allotted two seats. The conservative and elitist NSP favored Western-
style democracy but also argued for socialization of key economic industries.29 To 
overcome the inefficiency associated with Western democracy, it favored a 
strong, democratically elected “moral dictatorship,” but with adequate protections 
for individual rights.30 Although strongly anti-Marxist, the NSP was not totally 
opposed to making concessions with the Communists if it would help avert civil 
war. As long as the CCP stuck to its moderate demands of democracy and 
coalition government, even the ultraconservative Zhang Junmai was willing to 
negotiate.31  
The National Salvation Association (NSA), also allotted two seats, was 
not so much a party as a nationalist movement. During World War II, the NSA 
had close ties with Sun Yat-sen’s widow, Song Qingling, who helped organize 
student rallies against Japanese aggression. Its membership may have been small 
and loosely organized, but its social influence was enormous.32 Hoping to create a 
strong China independent of foreign imperialism, the NSA tried to patch up the 
old united front between the CCP and KMT.33 As Zhang Shenfu explained, unity 
and democracy were twin goals, and national strength would be secured through 
democratic reform.34 At the conference the NSA was represented by Shen Junru 
and Zhang Shenfu. 
The Vocational Education Association, (VEA), held one seat, occupied by 
its founder, Huang Yanpei. Huang’s vision was to democratize China through 
educational and economic reform, with American industrial-arts schools as his 
model.35 Huang’s relationship with the KMT was tenuous; at one time he had 
been marked for execution and was forced to go into hiding, but later he acted as 
Chiang’s trusted advisor and diplomat.36 He had recently been flown to CCP 
headquarters in Yenan, and was very impressed by what he saw. He realized that 
the CCP was not totally abolishing private property, and had actually achieved 
                                                          
29
 Fung, In Search, 133-34. 
30
 Ibid., 135-40. 
31
 Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, 172-96. 
32
 Ibid., 174. 
33
 Lutze, “New Democracy,” 255. 
34
 Fung, In Search, 300. 
35
 Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, 173. 
36
 Curran, “Educator to Politician,” 89-99. 
  
76
many of the reforms he himself sought.37 From that point on, Huang’s relations 
with CCP became much friendlier. 
One chair was given to Zhang Bojun, leader of the Provisional Action 
Committee of the KMT, also known as the Third Party. As Van Slyke wrote, 
“This party represented those members of the left-wing Kuomintang who had 
neither gone over to the Communists nor been reintegrated into the main body of 
the party after the split of 1927 at Wuhan.”38 Considered traitors and Communist 
agitators by many in the KMT, in 1946 this group remained intensely opposed to 
Chiang’s personal dictatorship, and had crowned itself the true inheritor of Sun 
Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles and Three Great Policies.39 
The final component of the DL was the Rural Reconstruction Association 
(RRA), a small group that hoped to improve the quality of life in the countryside 
through research and education.40 Only through reform and education, argued 
party leader Liang Shuming, could China regain the ideal of Confucian harmony 
and peace.41 The RRA argued for socialism and had close relations with the CCP, 
but never could accept class conflict as a solution to China’s unique situation.42 
This group was allotted one delegate, Liang, at the PCC.  
The last faction to add its voice to the PCC was the non-partisans. These 
men were chosen for their contributions to China’s social and intellectual culture. 
Included were two representatives of China’s highly respected newspaper Ta 
Kung Pao, as well as the esteemed educator Fu Sinian and the political scientist 
and historian Wang Yunwu. Other scholars, teachers, innovators, and thinkers 
brought the total number of independents to nine. It should also be noted that the 
distinctions among these liberal groups was blurred, and sometimes even 
overlapped with each other. Therefore, when reconstructing the third force’s plans 
it is dangerous to use any one politician’s statements as representative of the 
whole. Instead, party documents and platforms represent a more accurate method 
of reconstructing the third party’s plans and beliefs. 
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One such statement was delivered by Zhang Lan, chairman of the 
Democratic League, at the opening ceremony of the PCC on January 10. 
Delegates had cause to celebrate on this day: besides the successful start to the 
conference, George Marshall had just finalized a ceasefire agreement between the 
CCP and KMT, which many took as a good omen for the upcoming PCC. In his 
opening speech, Zhang summarized the party’s “detailed plan” and readiness to 
put political bickering aside to face the country’s pressing concerns. “To solve 
these problems, we emphasize the following points: first, we cannot violate the 
common will of the people; second, we cannot reject help from allies who have 
good intentions; and third, when a solution is reached, we must follow it sincerely 
and keep our promises.”43 However, as the third force knew all too well, good 
faith at the talks alone was not enough to guarantee peace. The first problem in 
any CCP-KMT settlement was overcoming the extreme level of suspicion and 
hostility between the two parties. George Marshal noted that “the greatest obstacle 
to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.”44 If the third 
force possessed no concrete solutions to overcome this impasse, then perhaps it is 
correct to label them as a fuzzy focus party that advocated democracy but had no 
idea how to make it work. However, numerous declarations circulated by third 
parties during the PCC suggest just the opposite. In fact, if historical documents 
attest to the presence of many practical suggestions to resolve the security 
dilemma.  
A statement by the China Democratic National Construction Association, 
a group founded by Huang Yanpei in 1945 provides a perfect illustration. 
Although this newly formed party held no seats at the PCC, its leader, Huang, was 
present as a representative of the Vocational Education Association. US State 
Department observers identified this new association as trustworthy and unbiased, 
“one of the most respectable and honest” of all the liberal groups.45 The party 
closely followed the PCC proceedings and concluded that tensions could be eased 
by the release of political prisoners, dissolution of secret service forces, and the 
use of nonpartisan inspectors to oversee bilateral demilitarization.46 Independent 
overseers could “survey possible conflict zones and report back to the conference. 
Then, if a conflict breaks out, we could allocate responsibility and it would be 
easier to stop the confrontation.”47 Newspapers in Shanghai also reported on five 
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suggestions presented by the Democratic League to ensure that the provisions of 
the PCC would be carried out. Among them were allowing the talks to be open 
and transparent so that no trickery or falsification could be employed later, 
ordering all military leaders to submit to the PCC’s authority, and requesting the 
creation of a committee to investigate infringements of the agreements, especially 
human rights violations.48 As these documents show, peace was more than an 
ideal for the liberals; it was a struggle, a formula designed to overcome clearly-
defined obstacles. However, an argument could still be made that, while third 
parties had a plan for peace, their democratic ideals were restricted to high-
sounding rhetoric, with no concrete plans, rendering them politically irrelevant. 
This accusation, too, is not borne out when one evaluates the real 
proposals and suggestions of the DL at the PCC. In actuality, the League’s 
proposals would not only have led to a peaceable China; they were also based on 
a solid and practicable understanding of how to run a modern, democratic 
country. Documents from the Democratic National Construction Association at 
the time of the PCC reveal no shortage in suggestions to implement democracy in 
reality, not just in the abstract. The party advocated a federal structure like the 
US, with more responsibility for local government, but also a national parliament 
elected through “universal suffrage and a thorough reform of local autonomy.”49 
As Gerry Groot, author of Managing Transitions, noted, the third force essentially 
based its political model on the West, especially the US and Britain.50 While it is 
true that the Democratic League relied heavily on the expertise of technocrats and 
intellectuals to lead the masses to democracy, Luo Longji definitively clarified 
that sovereignty was vested in ordinary citizens, and that these elites would be 
dismissed if their actions contravened the will of the people.51  
Many scholars protest that these parties were elitist, out of touch, and 
therefore not truly democratic.52 Some Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Junmai, 
believed that the people were not yet ready for its responsibilities; education and 
economic reform had to come first, and democracy would inevitably follow.53 
Yet, while all liberal leaders saw the necessity of educating the masses before 
democracy could flower, their thinking was no more illiberal than the founding 
fathers of the United States, and was in many ways much more progressive and 
democratic. For example, the political program of the Democratic League 
pronounced, “The nation will put into practice a system of general elections; 
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voting rights for the people; the right to be elected with absolutely no limits 
imposed by property ownership, education, belief, gender, or nationality.”54 The 
Democratic League’s principles clearly went further than a basic understanding of 
liberalism and democracy.  
A related charge against the third party was that because it was so elitist, it 
did not really represent the masses. Certainly, the men representing liberal forces 
at the PCC were much more educated and cosmopolitan than the vast majority of 
the country they served. It could be argued that this modern intelligentsia, so far 
removed from the lifestyle of the peasant, was not a true representation of the 
people. One humorous example of the skepticism Chinese third parties faced was 
retold in newspapers covering the PCC. General Marshall, attempting to learn 
more about the DL, had asked a certain Chinese friend how many people Luo 
Longji’s opinion could represent. The man replied that Luo could not even 
represent the opinion of his own wife, at which point “General Marshall laughed 
on hearing such an answer.”55 Other sources have chronicled Marshall’s 
frustration with third parties that exaggerated the number of members they could 
represent.56 The assumption was that these parties stood for a few urban elites, but 
in reality, the National Salvation Association and other democratic movements 
were able to consistently mobilize far beyond their formal memberships, with tens 
of thousands taking part in protests. In June of 1946, just five months after the 
PCC, the middle forces were able to rally fifty thousand protestors against the 
civil war. While the DL’s leaders may not have been a representative sample of 
the Chinese public, it would be careless to brand them as out of touch.57  
The Democratic League, diverse as it was, presented a unified economic 
plan, which aimed to reform the inept one-party control of industry, which had led 
to suffering for the workers.58 They called their proposal “national capitalism,” 
signifying that it was based on a combination of private enterprise and centralized 
state planning, and was intended to strengthen and serve the whole nation.59 Even 
right-leaning Zhang Junmai believed that China was not ready for capitalism, and 
called for state managed industry along with private capital.60 Finally, the DL’s 
economic model contained land reform provisions to help struggling peasants; in 
this way, the third force hoped to achieve a more equal society without the violent 
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class struggle so blatantly endorsed by Mao.61 While this economic proposal was 
strikingly similar to what the CCP recommended for China’s immediate future, 
the Rural Reconstruction Association’s leader Liang clarified that it was an 
alternative, and not a copy.62 In other words, his plan was to beat the Communists 
at their own game. 
The predominant, but mistaken, view on the Chinese middle forces is that 
they represented a hopelessly overpowered, politically insignificant group of 
elitists without a distinct plan to revitalize and save China. When Thomas Curran 
stated that “Huang and others like him never really conceived of a third party that 
could stand as an equal to the Nationalists and Communists,”63 he failed to realize 
that Liang Shuming and many others in the third party had long thought of 
themselves as strong enough and realistic enough to stand as an alternative to the 
KMT and CCP. In fact, as historian Thomas Lutze has found, at the time of the 
PCC, the Communists even thought of the third force this way.64 By assessing 
party speeches, positions, and platforms at the PCC, it is clear that the prevailing 
opinions about the middle force are misguided, and that they did indeed possess a 
concrete plan which could have successfully revitalized China and brought peace 
and democracy. As Zhang Junmai of the Democratic League recalled it, the PCC 
was a victory for the third force. It saw many of its designs and proposal 
implemented, only to be torn away by war.65 While it eventually turned out to be 
powerless to force the war to a halt, the third force was far from the pathetic, 
fuzzy focus parties described by Suzanne Pepper, Roger Jeans, and others. As 
Lutze pointed out, “Such conclusions slighting the liberals appear to be the result 
of historical hindsight, for at the time, these ‘democratic parties and personages’ 
were not so easily dismissed.”66 In fact, their vision was much more realistic than 
the KMT’s, which was dedicated to one party-rule and intolerance of diversity. 
The belligerent and undemocratic KMT, however, was the party that the US 
continued to fund on a colossal scale, inadvertently undermining the third force 
Marshall so dearly hoped would succeed, and with it, China’s hopes for peace. 
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